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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Forty-six-year-old Lisa Renee Hensdell was found guilty of leaving the scene of 
an injury accident. The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two 
years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Ms. Hensdell on supervised 
probation. Just over a year after Ms. Hensdell was sentenced, the district court ordered 
her to pay $36,317.07 in restitution, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5304. On appeal, 
Ms. Hensdell asserts that the district court exceeded its authority by entering the 
restitution order in contravention of I. C. § 19-5304(6). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
After a jury trial, Ms. Hensdell was found guilty of one count of leaving the scene 
of an injury accident, felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-8007, one count of inattentive 
driving, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 49-1401 (3), and one count of driving without 
privileges, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 18-8001 (3). 1 (R., pp.53-54, 64, 186-87, 
198.) The district court held a sentencing hearing on June 27, 2011. (R., p.197.) For 
the leaving the scene of an injury accident count, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of five years, with two years fixed. 2 (R., p.200.) The district court then 
1 The leaving the scene of an injury accident and inattentive driving counts were both in 
Bannock County Case No. CR 2010-4854. (R., p.198.) The driving without privileges 
count was in Bannock County Case No. CR 2010-4587, consolidated with No. 
CR 2010-4584. (R., pp.64, 198.) 
2 For the inattentive driving count, the district court imposed 90 days in the county jail. 
(R., p.200.) For the driving without privileges count, the district court imposed 180 days 
in the county jail. (R., pp.200-01.) The sentences for the inattentive driving and driving 
without privileges counts were to run concurrently with the sentence imposed for the 
leaving the scene of an injury accident count. (R., p.200.) 
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suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Hensdell on supervised probation for a period 
of five years. (R., p.201.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the district court asked the State, "[H]ow much time 
are you going to require for restitution?" (Tr., p.484, Ls.18-19.) The State told the 
district court: "I would think we should be able to get that compiled within a month, Your 
Honor." (Tr., p.484, Ls.20-21.) The district court then decided to "hold the restitution 
hearing at the time of the status hearing on September 26, 2011." (Tr., p.484, Ls.22-
24.) The judgment of conviction stated that "[t]he Court determines that this case is [or] 
may be appropriate for restitution, and a restitution hearing will be held at the time of the 
status conference on September 26, 2011." (R., p.202.) 
Before the date of the status hearing, the Idaho Department of Correction filed a 
report of probation violation alleging that Ms. Hensdell violated the terms and conditions 
of her probation by failing to report to her supervising officer as directed, failing to obtain 
full-time employment, using or possessing illegal drugs, and possessing firearms. 
(R., pp.215-17.) The State filed a motion to revoke Mr. Hensdell's probation. 
(R., pp.219-20.) Ms. Hensdell denied the alleged probation violations. (R., pp.228-29.) 
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Ms. Hensdell had violated her 
probation. (R., pp.231-33.) On October 3, 2011, the district court revoked her probation 
and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.237-41.) The order revoking probation stated that 
"[t]he Court determines that this is or maybe an appropriate case for restitution and 
restitution will be addressed at the Rider Review Hearing." (R., p.240.) 
Ms. Hensdell then participated in a "rider" program, and at the rider review 
hearing on April 2, 2012, the district court placed her on supervised probation for a 
period of five years. (R., pp.259-63.) The review hearing order stated that "[t]he Court 
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determines that this case may be appropriate for restitution, but restitution shall be held 
open until the 90 day status hearing." (R., p.262.) 
The district court held the 90 day status hearing on July 2, 2012. (Tr., p.487, 
Ls.7-12.) The State requested restitution in the total amount of $36,317.07.3 (See 
Tr., p.490, L.17 - p.491, L.10.) The district court then awarded $36,317.07 in 
restitution, pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304. (R., pp.246, 291-92; Tr., p.491, Ls.8-10.) Of that 
total amount, $1,172.14 would go to the victim, Jose Sanchez, and $35,144.93 would 
go to the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. (R., pp.246, 291-92; Tr., p.491, 
Ls.10-13.) The district court gave Ms. Hensdell 30 days to file any request for reduction 
of those amounts. (R., p.290; Tr., p.491, Ls.14-15.) However, Ms. Hensdell did not file 
a request for reduction. 
Ms. Hensdell then filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's 
restitution order. (R., pp.294-96.) 
3 The State had initially requested slightly more restitution in the total amount of 
$36,333.02 (R., pp.287-88), but later asked the district court to remove a $15.95 flu shot 
from the request (Tr., p.490, L.17 - p.491, L.10). 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court exceed its authority by entering the restitution order in 
contravention of I.C. § 19-5304(6)? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Exceeded Its Authority By Entering The Restitution Order In 
Contravention Of I.C. § 19-5304(6) 
Ms. Hensdell asserts that the district court exceeded its authority by entering the 
restitution order in contravention of I.C. § 19-5304(6), because it did not act consistently 
with the applicable legal standards in entering the restitution order. 
A district court may enter a restitution order "at the time of sentencing or such 
later date as deemed necessary by the court." I.C. § 19-5304(6). This provision 
"contemplates that the court may need to grant the prosecution a reasonable amount of 
time necessary to gather information so as to locate all victims and correctly compute 
the amount of restitution." State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659, 662 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(emphasis in original). A district court's decision to order restitution within the time limits 
found in I.C. § 19-5304(6) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Jensen, 
149 Idaho 758, 761-63 (Ct. App. 2010). 
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether 
the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. 
Id. at 763 (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600 (1989)). 
In Ferguson, the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated an award of restitution, in part, 
because the State failed to show that it was "necessary" to delay the entry of the order 
of restitution until about six years after sentencing. Ferguson, 138 Idaho at 662. The 
Court therefore held "that the trial court acted without authority when it entered the order 
of restitution," and accordingly vacated the district court's award of restitution. Id. 
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Similarly, in Jensen the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated an amended order of 
restitution entered more than six years after sentencing, because "[t]he district court 
made no finding, nor on the state of the record could it do so, that the delay was 
reasonably necessary for the processing of the request for restitution." Jensen, 149 
Idaho at 762-63. In Jensen, "[t]he State did not present evidence that the delay from 
sentencing to seeking restitution was necessary." Id. at 763. "The State acknowledged 
that the delay was not because of the time needed to process the request, but because 
the case 'fell through the cracks."' Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that "[t]he 
district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards in entering the 
amended order of restitution. . . . The district court, in entering the amended order of 
restitution, exceeded its authority under I.C. § 19-5304(6)." Id. Thus, the Court vacated 
the district court's amended order of restitution. Id. at 764. 
As in Ferguson and Jensen, the district court in this case did not find that the 
delay in entering the restitution order was reasonably necessary. (See R., pp.246, 291-
92.) But Ms. Hensdell did not object on this basis before the district court. "The 
fundamental error doctrine allows a criminal defendant the opportunity, in strictly limited 
circumstances, to raise an issue challenging his conviction on direct appeal that was not 
formally preserved before the trial court." State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 834 
(Ct. App. 2010). However, in Mosqueda the Idaho Court of Appeals held "that the 
fundamental error doctrine may not be invoked to raise a restitution issue for the first 
time on appeal because restitution proceedings are civil in nature." Id. 
Mindful of Mosqueda, Ms. Hensdell asserts that district court exceeded its 
authority by entering the restitution order in contravention of I.C. § 19-5304(6), because 
it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards in entering the restitution 
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order. Here, the district court made no finding that the delay in entering the restitution 
order just over a year after sentencing (from June 27, 2011 to July 2, 2012) was 
reasonably necessary for processing the State's request for restitution. By entering the 
restitution order without finding that the delay was reasonably necessary, the district 
court acted in contravention of I.C. § 19-5304(6). See Jensen, 149 Idaho at 762-63. 
Thus, the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards in 
entering the restitution order. See id. Ms. Hensdell therefore asserts that the district 
court exceeded its authority by entering the restitution order in contravention of 
I.C. § 19-5304(6), because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards 
in entering the restitution order. The restitution order should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Ms. Hensdell respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the restitution order. 
DATED this 15th day of May, 2013. 
~r~-
BEN PATRICKMCGREE\/Y' 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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